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Automated driving and its challenges to international
traﬃc law: which way to go?
Nynke E. Vellinga
Faculty of Law, University of Groningen, Groningen, the Netherlands
ABSTRACT
As more and more automated vehicles are being tested on public roads, it
becomes necessary to address the challenges that this technological
development poses to law. One of those challenges is the central concept of
driver in international traﬃc laws, notably the Geneva Convention on road
traﬃc of 1949 and the Vienna Convention on road traﬃc of 1968, these
Conventions forming the base of many national traﬃc laws. In this article, it
will be argued that an automated vehicle does not have a driver within the
meaning of the Conventions. Four diﬀerent approaches on how to revise the
Conventions will be discussed. A comparison of the approaches will bring out
the (dis)advantages of each approach and will lead to the recommendation of
one of the approaches.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 19 August 2018; Accepted 18 December 2018
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1. Introduction
Slowly, but gradually, more and more automated vehicles are being tested on
public roads. Given the progress made by several companies during the testing
of their vehicles, it will only be a matter of time before these vehicles become
available to the general public.1 Until then, legislators face legal challenges,
posed by the absence of a human driver behind the wheel. The dynamic
driving task – the longitudinal and lateral vehicle motion control, the moni-
toring of the environment via the detection of objects and events and respond-
ing to those objects and events, the manoeuvre planning and the enhancing of
conspicuity (signalling, gesturing, etc.)2 – is performed by a human when
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDer-
ivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distri-
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transformed, or built upon in any way.
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1For instance, Google claims to have driven over 8 million miles with their test vehicles on public roads:
waymo.com/ontheroad/ (accessed 15 August 2018).
2SAE International, J3016, June 2018, 6–7. See also: ECE Inland Transport Committee, Global Forum for
Road Traﬃc Safety, seventy-ﬁfth session, informal doc. No. 8, ‘Automated Vehicles: Policy and Principles
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driving a conventional vehicle. In an automated vehicle, however, the dynamic
driving task is performed by the self-driving system of that vehicle.3
This shift in performance of the dynamic driving task from the human
driver to the self-driving system gives rise to legal questions regarding traﬃc
laws. The Geneva Convention on road traﬃc of 1949 and the Vienna Conven-
tion on road traﬃc 1968, which lie at the base of many national traﬃc law, are
built around the notion of driver: in the 35 articles of the Geneva Convention,
the word driver is used 30 times, whereas in the Vienna Convention (56
articles) the word driver is used over 140 times (all excluding annexes). Both
Conventions are of great global importance as their Contracting Parties
need to base their national traﬃc laws on the Conventions (art. 3 Vienna Con-
vention, art. 6 Geneva Convention), thereby leading to uniform traﬃc rules
across borders. At the moment of writing, the Geneva Conventions has 97
Contracting States4, whereas the younger Vienna Convention has 77 Con-
tracting Parties (several of which are also party to the Geneva Convention).5
The legal questions regarding traﬃc law discussed in this paper, are pri-
marily questions of public law. The outcomes of these questions are,
however, also important for tort law as the violation of a statutory rule, e.g.
a traﬃc rule, can give rise to liability.6 In regimes with a no-fault compen-
sation scheme, as discussed recently in this journal7, this is of lesser impor-
tance. A no-fault compensation scheme would provide compensation
without needing to ﬁnd a liable person (or driver), proof of negligence and
causality, making the question whether or not a statutory rule has been vio-
lated less relevant to obtain compensation.8
In this article, reference will be made to the SAE international which
describes six levels of automation, ranging from level 0 (no driving auto-
mation) to level 5 (full driving automaton).9 For present purposes, ‘automated
vehicle’means an SAE level 4 or an SAE level 5 vehicle.10 These vehicles are able
to drive themselves either for an entire trip (Level 5) or part of a trip (Level 4).11
Discussion Document’, submitted by Germany, Japan, Spain, the Netherlands and United Kingdom, 4
September 2017, 9–10; and, JA Michon, ‘A Critical View Of Driver Behavior Models: What Do We
Know, What Should We Do?’ (1985), jamichon.nl/jam_writings/1985_criticial_view.pdf (accessed 9
August 2018).
3The strategic functions involved in driving, such as the scheduling of the trip and determining a destina-
tion, are always performed by a human. SAE International, J3016 (n 2) 5–7, ECE Inland Transport Com-
mittee (n 2) 10.
4http://www.unece.org/trans/maps/un-transport-agreements-and-conventions-07.html (accessed 28 June
2018).
5http://www.unece.org/trans/maps/un-transport-agreements-and-conventions-08.html (accessed 28 June
2018).
6C van Dam, European Tort Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 279ﬀ, 408ﬀ.
7M Schellekens, ‘No-fault compensation schemes for self-driving vehicles’ (2018) 10 Law, Innovation and
Technology 314.
8M Schellekens (n 7).
9SAE International (n 2).
10Ibid., 19ﬀ.
11Ibid.
258 N. E. VELLINGA
What are the consequences of the absence of a human behind the wheel,
and the resulting shift in performance of the dynamic driving task, for the
Geneva Convention and the Vienna Convention? Do these Conventions
require revision in order to accommodate automated driving? In this
article, it will be argued that, given the current interpretation of the Conven-
tions, an automated vehicle does not have a driver within the meaning of the
Conventions.
Four diﬀerent approaches on how to revise the Conventions in order to
accommodate automated driving will be discussed. First, it will be explored
how traﬃc laws governing other modes of transport that are familiar with a
degree of automation accommodate this automation and whether this
approach would be suitable to apply to a revision of the Conventions
[option 1]. Novel interpretations, viewing the Conventions as ‘living instru-
ments’, might also accommodate automated driving. In this light, we will
discuss how the interpretation of the notion of driver can depend on the func-
tion of the notion [option 2] and whether or not the user can be regarded to be
the driver within the meaning of the Conventions when interpreting the Con-
ventions diﬀerently [option 3]. Finally, drawing on Dutch law, we explore the
functioneel daderschap approach [option 4]. Having evaluated each of these
options, it will be argued that functioneel daderschap is the preferred
approach.
2. The notion of driver in the Conventions
2.1. The functions of the notion of driver in the Conventions
Although the term driver is used in the Conventions in relation to more than
one function12, for present purposes, it is the use of the term in the context of
the rules of conduct (the rules of the road, Chapter II of both Conventions)
that is focal. These rules impose duties on drivers. For instance, the driver
should not drive whilst being distracted (art. 8 paragraph 6 Vienna Conven-
tion) and a driver has to, before making a turn, make sure that he can do so
without danger to other road users (art. 12 paragraph 4(a) Geneva Conven-
tion). These provisions and other provisions are based on art. 8 paragraph
1 Geneva Convention and art. 8 paragraph 1 Vienna Convention.13
Art. 8 paragraph 1 Vienna Convention: ‘Every moving vehicle or combination
of vehicles shall have a driver.’
The driver can perform these duties as he is able to control his vehicle:
12See for instance art. 8 paragraph 4 Vienna Convention, where the notion of driver is used in capacity
requirements.
13For matters of readability, the Geneva Convention will only be quoted in case it signiﬁcantly deviates
from the Vienna Convention.
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Art. 8 paragraph 5 Vienna Convention: ‘Every driver shall at all times be able to
control his vehicle or to guide his animals.’14
2.2. The notion of driver and control
What consequences do these provisions have for automated driving? The
requirement of control seems to leave a bit of room for a driver to let the
car handle (parts of) the dynamic driving task, especially art. 8 paragraph 5
Geneva Convention and art. 8 paragraph 5 Vienna Convention. Although
these provisions require that the driver should at all times be able to control
his vehicle, they might be taken to imply that the driver does not have to actu-
ally exercise that control at all times – in other words, it suﬃces that the driver
is able to exercise that control at any given time. However, even if this is the
case, there would still need to be a driver that can exercise the control at any
given time. Because an automated vehicle does not have a human performing
the dynamic driving task, this raises the question if an automated vehicle even
has a driver within the meaning of the Conventions.
2.3. The deﬁnition of the notion of driver
The Conventions provide the following deﬁnition for driver:
Art. 1(v) Vienna Convention: ‘“Driver” means any person who drives a motor
vehicle or other vehicle (including a cycle), or who guides cattle, singly or in
herds, or ﬂocks, or draught, pack or saddle animals on a road (…)’15
This does not provide much clarity. Is the person who falls asleep behind the
wheel still the driver of the vehicle? Or the person who pulls the hand brake
from the passenger’s seat? And regarding automated driving: is the person
who only decides on the destination of an automated vehicle the driver of
that vehicle?
2.4. The interpretation of the notion of driver
There has not been much discussion about the deﬁnition of driver in the Con-
ventions.16 During the drafting process of the Geneva Convention, the matter
was raised brieﬂy. The French representative stated ‘that to deﬁne driver, (…),
was not to deﬁne the word at all.’17 The French deﬁnition of driver in the
oﬃcial translation of the Geneva Convention therefore reads:
14See also art. 13 paragraph 1 Vienna Convention.
15See also art. 4 paragraph 1 Geneva Convention.
16Bryant Walker Smith, ‘Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States’ (2014) 1 Texas A&M
Law Review 411, 428. Available at SSRN: www.ssrn.com/abstract=2303904 (accessed 15 August 2018).
17United Nations Conference on Road and Motor Transport, Committee III on Road Traﬃc, Summary
Record of the Seventeenth Meeting, Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 6 September
1949 at 3 pm, E/CONF.8/C.III/SR.17/Rev.1, 21 November 1949, p. 2.
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Le terme “conducteur” désigne toutes personnes qui assument la direction de
véhicules, y compris les cycles, guident des animaux de trait, de charge, de
selle, des troupeaux sur une route, ou qui en ont la maîtrise eﬀective;18
Since the rise of driver assistance systems, the notion of driver has been subject
of discussion in WP.1, the United Nations ECE organ responsible for keeping
the Conventions up to date, more often. The debate has, so far, not led to a
clear position on the deﬁnition of driver.19 A complete picture of a more
precise interpretation of the notion of driver is therefore not yet provided
for. However, a closer look into the deﬁnition of driver given by Contracting
Parties in their national laws can provide more insight.
In German20 law reference to the driver (in German: Fahrzeugführer) is
made in, amongst others, the Straßenverkehrsordnung (StVO),
Straßenverkehrsgesetz (StVG) and the Strafgesetzbuch (StGB). The German
constitutional court (BGH) has described driver and driving as follows:
Führer eines Kraftfahrzeuges im Sinne dieser Bestimmung ist, wer das Fahrzeug
in Bewegung zu setzen beginnt, es in Bewegung hält oder allgemein mit dem
Betrieb des Fahrzeugs oder mit der Bewältigung von Verkehrsvorgängen
beschäftigt ist. Bringt ein Kraftfahrer sein Fahrzeug nicht verkehrsbedingt
zum Stehen, bleibt er solange Führer des Kraftfahrzeugs, wie er sich noch im
Fahrzeug aufhält und mit dessen Betrieb oder mit der Bewältigung von Ver-
kehrsvorgängen beschäftigt ist. Dies ist regelmäßig erst dann nicht mehr der
Fall, wenn er sein Fahrzeug zum Halten gebracht und den Motor ausgestellt
hat.21
The Dutch interpretation of driver (bestuurder) deviates from the German
deﬁnition, even though both countries are parties to the Vienna Conven-
tion22: if a person inﬂuences the direction and/or speed in which the
vehicle is moving by operating the controls, he is driving the vehicle and
therefore he is regarded as being the driver of that vehicle, regardless of his
18Translated: ‘The term “driver” refers to all persons who assume the direction of vehicles, including cycles,
guide draft animals, pack animals, saddle animals, herd animals on a road, or who have eﬀective control.’
19See for instance Informal Document no. 2, ‘Automated Driving’, submitted by the Chair of WP.1 Informal
Working Group of Experts on Automated Driving (IWG-AD), 74th session 21–24 March 2017, 14 March
2017, Informal document no. 4, ‘Automated driving’, submitted by the Chair of WP.1 Informal Group of
Experts on Automated Driving, 73rd session 19–22 September 2015, 14 September 2016.
20Germany is party to the Vienna Convention, but not to the Geneva Convention.
21Translated:
Driver of a motor vehicle within the meaning of this provision is who starts to set the vehicle in
motion, who keeps the vehicle moving or who is generally occupied with the operation of the
vehicle or with the handling of traﬃc operations. If a driver does not bring his vehicle to a halt
due to traﬃc conditions, he remains the driver of the motor vehicle so long as he is still in the
vehicle and occupied with the operation of the vehicle or with the handling of traﬃc operations.
This is usually no longer the case if he has stopped the vehicle and turned oﬀ the engine.
BGH 4 StR 592/16, 27 April 2017, ECLI:DE:BGH:2017:270417U4STR592.16.0. See with regards to the
Vienna Convention: Franke, ‘Rechtsprobleme beim automatisierten Fahren - ein Überblick’, DAR 2/2016.
22See also Advies Raad van State, kamerstukken II 2017/18, 34838 nr. 4. See more extensively on the Dutch
bestuurdersbegrip: JBHM Simmelink, Algemeenheden in het wegenverkeersrecht (Quint 1995), paragraph
2.3.3.1.
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position in the vehicle.23 The passenger that pulls the hand brake is at that
moment the driver of that vehicle.24 Even a vehicle that is being towed can
have a driver, as long as the person can inﬂuence the direction the vehicle
is travelling in.25 A driver does not necessarily have to be inside the
vehicle26: a person walking next to the car, while the motor is running and
the person is determining the direction of the vehicle by using the steering
wheel, leaning through the open window, is the driver of that vehicle.27
From these descriptions of the notion of driver it follows that the driver can
decide on the direction and speed (lateral and longitudinal control) by oper-
ating at least some of the controls of the vehicle.28 His actions have an
immediate eﬀect on the speed and direction of the vehicle, the decisions are
made on the spot. This gives rise to the question whether or not an automated
vehicle has a driver within the meaning of the Conventions.
3. The driver of an automated vehicle
3.1. The possible drivers of an automated vehicle
Given these features of the notion of driver, who or what can possibly be
regarded as being the driver of an automated vehicle? Perhaps the manufac-
turer of the vehicle, the company that programmed the software, the system of
the automated vehicle (the self-driving system), or the person that uses the
vehicle to get to work? These parties all have in common that in one way
or another they inﬂuence the direction and/or speed of the vehicle.
3.1.1. The manufacturer as driver of the automated vehicle?
For instance, the manufacturer of the vehicle and the company that pro-
grammed the software do so before the automated vehicle drives down
public roads by equipping the vehicle with certain radars, cameras, and by
programming the software in a certain way. Can either of these legal
persons be treated as the driver of the automated vehicle? The deﬁnition of
driver from art. 4 paragraph 1 Geneva Convention and art. 1(v) Vienna Con-
vention requires that the driver is a person. Although this does not seem to
exclude a legal person, given the current state of the discussion, the time of
writing of the Conventions and the overall structure of the Conventions –
namely, a legal person with a driving permit (art. 41 Vienna Convention,
23HR 13 August 2005, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AT7292, NJ 2005, 542.
24Ibid.
25HR 2 February 1965; ECLI:NL:HR:1965:AB3467, NJ 1965, 281; HR 26 January 1971, ECLI:NL:HR:AB5997, NJ
1971, 208; HR 1 December 1987, ECLI:NL:HR:1987:AB7814, NJ 1988, 689; HR 2 October 1990, ECLI:NL:
HR:1990:ZC8593, NJ 1991, 380.
26See regarding stepping out of the vehicle: HR 21 October 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AL3411, VR 2004, 36.
27HR 12 June 1990, ECLI:NL:HR:1990:ZC8550, NJ 1991, 29, VR 1990, 158. See also HR 23 February 1999,
ECLI:NL:HR:1999:ZD348, VR 2000, 81.
28See also JBHM Simmelink, Algemeenheden in het wegenverkeersrecht (Quint 1995), p. 77.
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art. 24 Geneva Convention), a ﬁt physical and mental condition of a legal
person (art. 8 paragraph 3 Vienna Convention) – by person in this context
a human is meant. Therefore, neither the manufacturer of the automated
vehicle nor the company that programmed the software can be classiﬁed as
the driver of the automated vehicle within the meaning of the Conventions.
3.1.2. The self-driving system as the driver of the automated vehicle?
As the driver within the meaning of the Conventions is a human, the self-
driving system (SDS) of the vehicle, that makes all the decisions regarding
the dynamic driving task, is not the driver. In a diﬀerent context however –
that of technical regulations – the notion of driver is sometimes interpreted
in such a way that it does entail the self-driving system. An example is the
interpretation the United States National Highway Traﬃc Safety Adminis-
tration (or NHTSA) gave of several US Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Stan-
dards (FMVSS):
If no human occupant of the vehicle can actually drive the vehicle, it is more
reasonable to identify the “driver” as whatever (as opposed to whomever) is
doing the driving. In this instance, an item of motor vehicle equipment, the
SDS, is actually driving the vehicle.29
Even if the deﬁnition of driver would be diﬀerent, applying this reasoning
to the notion of driver in the Conventions would still prove challenging. The
driver in the Conventions has rights and obligations, whereas the driver in
technical regulations (often) has not. In technical regulations, the notion of
driver is used to describe a passive object.30
3.1.3. The user as the driver of the automated vehicle?
In the future, someone might summon an automated vehicle to pick him up
after, for instance, doing the groceries. This user – the person using the auto-
mated vehicle for a trip, although he is not necessarily inside or in the vicinity
of the vehicle – decides on the direction of the vehicle by providing its desti-
nation and he dispatches the vehicle. Is deciding on the destination and dis-
patching the automated vehicle enough to regard the user as the driver of the
vehicle within the meaning of the Conventions? The user meets the require-
ment that the driver has to be human. But does the user ‘drive’? As discussed,
the driver within the meaning of the Conventions will have to decide on the
direction and speed by operating at least some of the controls of the vehicle.
His actions have an immediate eﬀect on the speed and direction of the vehicle.
29Letter of interpretation of the NHTSA to Chris Urmson, Director of the Self-Driving Car Project of Google,
Inc. (4 February 2016) https://isearch.nhtsa.gov/ﬁles/Google%20--%20compiled%20response%20to%
2012%20Nov%20%2015%20interp%20request%20--%204%20Feb%2016%20ﬁnal.htm (accessed 9
August 2018).
30See for instance UNECE Regulation No. 79, 5.4.1.1: ‘Any fault which impairs the steering function and is
not mechanical in nature must be signaled clearly to the driver of the vehicle.(…)’.
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Although the user does decide on the destination of the vehicle, he does not
decide on the direction and speed at any given point in time during the trip.
The user does not decide to make a left turn, to swerve, to brake. The actions
of the user do not have immediate eﬀect – he might change the destination but
that does not have the same direct eﬀect as swerving, braking, etc. The user
cannot exercise any lateral or longitudinal control. In other words: the user
does not perform the dynamic driving task. Taking all this into account,
the user cannot be regarded as being the driver within the meaning of the
Conventions.31
3.2. An automated vehicle is driverless within the meaning of the
Conventions
As all the parties discussed cannot be regarded as being the driver within the
meaning of the Conventions, these instruments will need to be revised or a
new Convention on road traﬃc law will need to be drafted in order to accom-
modate automated driving. Below, some possible ways to revise the Conven-
tions so that they do accommodate automated driving are discussed.
4. Laws of other modes of transport as source of inspiration
[Option 1]
4.1. Maritime and aviation traﬃc law
Aviation and maritime transport are two modes of transport that have already
been confronted with (a degree of) automation. Although the level of auto-
mation of an autopilot of a vessel or aircraft might not be as high as the
expected level of automation of an automated vehicle – the autopilot on
board an aircraft or ship needs a certain level of supervision and might not
respond to objects and events (see for instance paragraph 10 of the IMO Rec-
ommendation on navigational watchkeeping) – maritime and aviation traﬃc
law could provide inspiration for revising the Conventions.
International rules on air traﬃc can be found in Annex 2 to the Convention
on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention). See for example the
provision on how to handle a head-on situation:
3.2.2.2 Annex 2 Chicago Convention: ‘(…) When two aircraft are approaching
head-on or approximately so and there is danger of collision, each shall alter its
heading to the right.’
This traﬃc rule is not directed at the pilot (as the traﬃc rules from the Geneva
Convention and the Vienna Convention are directed at the driver of the
31It can be argued that if the user pulls the emergency brake of the automated vehicle (if the vehicle is
equipped with one) for that short moment he is the driver of that vehicle.
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vehicle), but at the aircraft itself. The responsibility for complying with these
and other air traﬃc rules lies with the pilot-in-command.32 It is not relevant if
this pilot-in-command actually operates the controls:
2.3.1 Annex 2 Chicago Convention: ‘The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall,
whether manipulating the controls or not, be responsible for the operation of
the aircraft in accordance with the rules of the air, except that the pilot-in-
command may depart from these rules in circumstances that render such
departure absolutely necessary in the interests of safety.’
So even though the pilot-in-command might not be operating the controls,
perhaps he is not even anywhere near the controls, he is responsible for the oper-
ation of the aircraft. It is not relevant if the operation of the aircraft is performed
by a pilot, the autopilot or someone else; the pilot-in-command is responsible.
A similar situation can be found in maritime traﬃc law, in the United
Nations International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea of 1972
(COLREGS 1972). Here, the master of the ship is one of the persons respon-
sible for the operation of the ship in accordance with the traﬃc rules:
Rule 2 a COLREGS 1972: ‘Nothing in these Rules shall exonerate any vessel, or
the owner, master or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to
comply with these Rules or of the neglect of any precaution which may be
required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances
of the case.’
The master of the ship can be, besides the owner or the crew, held responsible
for the operation of the ship although he might not have been operating the
controls.33 The traﬃc rules from the COLREGS are also, similar to the
Chicago Convention, not directed at a person but at the vessel:
Rule 14 COLREGS 1972: ‘(…) When two power-driven vessels are meeting on
reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses so as to involve risk of collision, each
shall alter her course to starboard so that each shall pass on the port side of
the other.(…)’
4.2. A distinction between operation and responsibility
As follows from the above, the structure of the traﬃc rules of Annex 2 to the
Chicago Convention and the COLREGS 1972 diﬀer from the structure of the
rules of conduct of the Geneva Convention and the Vienna Convention:
. The traﬃc rules are directed at the vessel or aircraft, not at the person that
might operate the controls;
32See on the ‘“see-and-avoid” requirement’: Douglas Marshall, ‘Unmanned Aerial Systems and Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization Regulations’ (2009) 85 North Dakota Law Review 693.
33AN Cockcroft and LNF Lameijer, A Guide to the Collision Avoidance Rules: International Regulations for Pre-
venting Collisions at Sea (Elsevier, 2012).
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. The responsibility for the compliance with the traﬃc rules lies with a
person that does not necessarily operate the controls.
As a result, it is not important if the autopilot or a crew member performs
the tasks involved in ﬂying or sailing; the aircraft or vessel has to ‘behave’ in
accordance with the traﬃc rules and someone bears responsibility for this. A
distinction is made between who or what performs the dynamic driving task
and who is responsible for the performance of the dynamic driving task: the
dynamic driving task is performed by a pilot of an aircraft by operating the
yoke or by the autopilot that keeps the aircraft on a certain height and
course, whilst the pilot-in-command is responsible for the performance of
the dynamic driving/ﬂying task (2.3.1 Annex 2 Chicago Convention). Respon-
sibility in this context does not equal liability. Under national law more factors
can play a role in establishing (civil or criminal) liability.
This approach can be used in revising the road traﬃc law.34When applying
the same structure as in maritime and aviation traﬃc law, the self-driving
system of the automated vehicle performs the dynamic driving task, for
which perhaps a person can be held responsible. This opens up the possibility
to assign responsibility to a legal person, like the manufacturer. This approach
would accommodate traﬃc of mixed levels of automation without the need
for a diﬀerent law or other instrument for each level of automation. If the con-
ventional driver performs the dynamic driving task, he can be held respon-
sible for the performance of that task; if the self-driving system performs
the dynamic driving task the responsibility for the performance of that
dynamic driving task can be assigned to a (legal) person.
4.3. The vehicle and the Conventions
To revise the Conventions using the same approach as the approach in the
discussed aviation and maritime traﬃc law, three steps need to be taken:
. A vehicle should no longer need to have a driver;
. The rules of conduct need to be directed at the vehicle instead of the driver;
. A person or persons (not necessarily a human) should be made responsible
for the operation of the vehicle in accordance with the traﬃc rules.
As a result, a distinction is made between who or what performs the
dynamic driving task and who is responsible for the performance of the
dynamic driving task. There is still someone responsible for the operation
of the vehicle like the conventional driver is under the current Conventions,
34See also NE Vellinga, ‘Self-driving Vehicles: Preparing Road Traﬃc Law for a Driverless Future’, discussed
at the World ITS Congress in Copenhagen, 17–21 September 2018.
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even though there is no longer a driver within the current meaning of the
Geneva Convention and Vienna Convention, and vehicles of all levels of auto-
mation need to obey the same traﬃc rules.
To reach this result, art. 8 paragraph 1 of the Geneva Convention and art. 8
paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention, that both state that every vehicle
should have a driver, need to be revised. As discussed above, an automated
vehicle does not have a driver within the meaning of the Conventions. So
in order to accommodate automated driving, these provisions will either
need to be revised or deleted. For example, the provisions could state that a
vehicle should have a driver or a self-driving system. Either way, it can no
longer be required for a vehicle to have a driver.
The next step is to revise the rules of conduct in such a way that they
are no longer directed at the driver but at the vehicle, just like the rules on
avoiding a head-on collision of Annex 2 of the Chicago Convention and
the COLREGS 1972. Take for example art. 11 paragraph 1(a) of the
Vienna Convention on overtaking (see also art. 11 paragraph 1 Geneva
Convention) which states:
Drivers overtaking shall do so on the side opposite to that appropriate to the
direction of traﬃc.
A revised provision, that is directed at the vehicle instead of the driver, could
state:
Vehicles overtaking shall do so on the side opposite to that appropriate to the
direction of traﬃc.
Other rules of conduct do not need revision to accommodate automated
driving because they are only suitable for a situation where there is a conven-
tional driver behind the wheel. A revision would not beneﬁt road safety or it is
simply not possible for a vehicle to perform the obligation. See for instance art.
7 paragraph 5 on the wearing of safety belts:
The wearing of safety belts is compulsory for drivers and passengers of motor
vehicles, occupying seats equipped with such belts, save where exceptions are
granted by domestic legislation.
It would not beneﬁt road safety to also make it compulsory for vehicles
to wear safety belts (aside from the question how a vehicle can actually
wear such a belt). This provision can therefore be left as it is; this way
it remains compulsory for passengers (of conventional vehicles and of
automated vehicles) and conventional drivers to wear safety belts, which
contributes to safety.35
35World Health Organization, World Report on Road Traﬃc Injury Prevention (WHO 2004).
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4.4. Responsibility
To come to a separation between who or what performs the dynamic driving
task and who or what is responsible, it will be necessary, just like in Annex 2 of
the Chicago Convention and the COLREGS 1972, to assign a person as the
person who bears responsibility for the operation of the automated vehicle
in accordance with the traﬃc rules. This person could be a human, or
perhaps a legal person. After all, the responsible (legal) person does not
have to be able to perform the dynamic driving task, he only bears responsi-
bility for the performance of the dynamic driving task. With whom the
responsibility rests is of importance as it can play a role in establishing liab-
ility, although this role would be limited if a no-fault compensation scheme is
in place.36
Regarding conventional vehicles, there does not seem to be a reason why
the conventional driver cannot remain responsible. But who should bear
the responsibility for the performance of the dynamic driving task of an auto-
mated vehicle?
It can be argued that the manufacturer of the vehicle or the company that
programmed the software should be responsible as they can inﬂuence the
operation of the vehicle by the choices they make in hardware (radars,
cameras, processing power, etc.) and software (for instance by programming
the distance between the automated vehicle and the vehicle driving in front of
it). However, the user and the owner of the vehicle can also inﬂuence the oper-
ation of the vehicle somewhat (by (lack of) maintenance, by choosing (not) to
use the vehicle, by ignoring a software update, etc.). Perhaps they should bear
responsibility, or perhaps multiple persons should bear responsibility. An
example of the latter is Rule 2 a of the COLREGS 1972: the owner of the
vessel, the master of the vessel or the crew can be held responsible for the
operation of the vehicle.37Further discussion is needed to come to the assign-
ment of a responsible person.38
4.5. Arguments for and against the approach
The approach discussed above has several advantages. It provides for mixed
traﬃc, where vehicles of diﬀerent levels of automation share the public
roads. The newest model of a fully automated vehicle, a car with adaptive
36M Schellekens (n 7).
37Cockcroft and Lameijer (n 33).
38This also raises the question of whether perhaps robots should be assigned legal personhood and be
responsible for their own actions, see for instance: Directorate-general for internal policies, policy
department C: ‘Citizens’ rights and constitutional aﬀairs, legal aﬀairs, European civil law rules in robotics
study’, 2016, p. 14ﬀ; European Parliament Report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law
Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)), paragraph 59; Commission, ‘Artiﬁcial Intelligence for Europe’ COM
(2018) 237 ﬁnal, 25; http://www.robotics-openletter.eu/ (accessed 9 August 2018); T Hartlief ‘Van knappe
koppen en hun uitvindingen’ NJB 2018/878.
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cruise control or an old-timer: all vehicles have to ‘behave’ in accordance with
the same traﬃc rules.39 Once there is agreement on who should be responsible
for the operation of the vehicle in accordance with the traﬃc rules, all parties
involved will have more certainty on their legal position. For the legal position
of conventional drivers driving conventional vehicles, these changes would
not have any negative consequences: in the end their position remains as it
is. Besides, the Vienna Convention is familiar with the discussed approach,
as it already has a provision formulated according to this approach:
A vehicle shall not overtake another vehicle which is approaching a pedestrian
crossing marked on the carriageway or sign-posted as such, or which is stopped
immediately before the crossing, otherwise than at a speed low enough to
enable it to stop immediately if a pedestrian is on the crossing. (…). (art. 11
paragraph 9 Vienna Convention)
The approach does, nevertheless, require an extensive overhaul of the Con-
ventions. Multiple provisions of both Conventions will have to be amended.
The amending processes of both Conventions – especially of the Geneva
Convention – are time-consuming (art. 31 Geneva Convention, art. 49
Vienna Convention). Coordinating the amendment processes to avoid
divergence between the two Conventions will be challenging, as well as
reaching the required majorities. This has already proven to be diﬃcult40
and might not be politically feasible. Instead of choosing to take the route
of amending the Conventions, drafting a new Convention using the
approach discussed above can also provide the desired result. This way,
the diﬃcult amending process can be avoided. However, less drastic
options should also be explored.
5. A diﬀerent driver per function of the notion of driver
[Option 2]
5.1. The interpretation of the notion of driver depending on its
function
On the assumption that the Conventions might be interpreted relatively
ﬂexibly as living instruments41, it might be possible to accommodate the
notion of a driver to automated vehicles. As touched upon above, the function
of the notion of driver can diﬀer depending on the context. For reasons of
brevity, only a novel interpretation of the notion of driver in rules of
conduct will be discussed below.
39See in a diﬀerent context on the importance of this: Benjamin von Bodungen and Martin Hoﬀmann,
‘Belgien und Schweden schlagen vor: Das Fahrsystem soll Fahrer werden!’ NZV 2015, 521.
40See ECE/TRANS/WP.1/20141, ECE/TRANS/WP.1/2014/4/Rev.1, ECE/TRANS/WP.1/145.
41See for instance Tyrer v. United Kingdom App no 5856/72 (ECHR, 25 April 1978) with regard to the Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
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5.2. The notion of driver in rules of conduct
The notion of driver is omnipresent in the traﬃc rules of both Conventions
(Chapter II Geneva Convention, Chapter II Vienna Convention). Duties are
imposed upon the driver: the driver has to overtake in a certain manner
(art. 11 Geneva Convention, art. 11 Vienna Convention), the driver should
show extra care around vulnerable road users (art. 7 paragraph 3 Vienna Con-
vention), the driver should not brake abruptly unless it is necessary to do so
for safety reasons (art. 17 paragraph 1 Vienna Convention), and so on. A
living instrument approach would open up the possibility of broadening the
interpretation of the notion of driver from ‘the human who drives’, to ‘who
or what drives the vehicle’. The traﬃc rules would no longer be directed
only at the human driver, but also at the self-driving system or the vehicle
itself. This way, the Conventions would accommodate automated driving.
The requirement that every vehicle should have a driver (art. 8 paragraph 1
Geneva Convention, art. 8 paragraph 1 Vienna Convention), is met by this
approach. In this context, the notion of driver should be interpreted as who
or what drives the vehicle. So, this can be a human driver when the vehicle
is a conventional vehicle, or the self-driving system of an automated
vehicle. However, before it is possible to use the living instrument approach
to interpret the Conventions, the deﬁnitions of the notion of driver given
by the Conventions need changing. Currently, the Conventions state that
the driver is the person who drives the vehicle (art. 4 paragraph 1 Geneva Con-
vention, art. 1 (v) Vienna Convention). This deﬁnition prevents interpreting
the driver as being the self-driving system. Therefore, the deﬁnition needs
either to be changed into stating that the driver is anything or any person
driving the vehicle, or to be completely removed from the Conventions.
This last option provides optimal ﬂexibility for the years to come, for unfore-
seen developments.
5.3. Arguments for and against this approach
The living instrument approach shines a new light on the interpretation of the
notion of driver. One way to interpret the notion of driver is, as discussed, to
interpret the notion per function instead of having one and the same
interpretation of the notion throughout the Conventions. An advantage of
this approach is that, besides the deletion of the deﬁnition of driver (art. 4
paragraph 1 Geneva Convention, art. 1 (v) Vienna Convention), it does not
require amendments to be made to the Conventions. This avoids a complex
and lengthy amendment process. However, the approach comes with a
degree of uncertainty as the interpretation of the notion of driver, and there-
fore where the responsibility for the traﬃc behaviour lies, can diﬀer depending
on the function of the notion in that speciﬁc context. This can be overcome by
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capturing the interpretation of the notion of driver in its diﬀerent functions in
an agreement between the Contracting Parties to the Conventions (ex. Art. 31
(3)(a) Vienna Convention on the law of treaties). Although this requires con-
sensus between the parties, it could well be an easier process than amending
the Conventions as it does not require following a ﬁxed process. This also pro-
vides ﬂexibility; if unforeseen circumstances arise, the agreement can be
adjusted if needed without having to go through the amendment procedure.
It may, however, still leave the national legislator with uncertainty concerning
the compatibility of national traﬃc laws with the interpretation of the notion
of driver in the Conventions. Besides, if the driver is the self-driving system, it
leaves unanswered the question of who is responsible for the acts of the driver.
6. The user operating the controls? [Option 3]
6.1. The start button as a control of the automated vehicle
Perhaps there is a less complicated solution than the approach discussed in
the previous section, where the focus was on who or what operated the
vehicle, who or what performed the dynamic driving task. Instead, the empha-
sis might be more on the operation of the controls of the vehicle. After all, the
traditional controls of the vehicle will disappear: a fully automated vehicle will
probably not have pedals or a steering wheel. It will, however, have a new
element: a start button42 with which to dispatch the vehicle. Given the starting
point that the Conventions are living instruments, can this start button be
regarded as a control of the vehicle and if so, does that mean that the user
of the vehicle – the human using the start button to dispatch the vehicle
and who determines its destination – can be regarded as the driver of the auto-
mated vehicle?
6.2. The controls and the driver of an automated vehicle
It can be argued that, although the automated vehicle does not have the
traditional controls, the start button is the control of a fully automated
vehicle. The start button almost forms a sort of overlapping control
which allows the self-driving system to use the controls that are needed
for steering, braking, accelerating, etc. Though this interpretation of
control might not ﬁt with the current interpretation of the notion of
control, the living instrument approach opens up the possibility for this
novel interpretation.
42See for instance Darrell Etherington, ‘Waymo’s First Product will be Its Own On-demand Ride Hailing
Service’ (TechCrunch, 7 November 2017) https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/07/waymos-ﬁrst-
commercial-product-will-be-its-own-on-demand-ride-hailing-service/?guccounter=1 (accessed 16
August 2018).
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If the start button can be regarded as a control of the automated vehicle, it
can be argued that the user is the driver of the automated vehicle: the user
operates the control (the start button), thereby in a sense deciding on the
direction and speed of the vehicle, and the user is human. This would
mean that the user ﬁlls the void the conventional driver left behind. The Con-
ventions do not need to be amended to provide for this new interpretation.
However, for some provisions it is not necessary to change but desirable
nevertheless. For instance art. 8 paragraph 3 Vienna Convention:
‘Every driver shall possess the necessary physical and mental ability and be in a
ﬁt physical and mental condition to drive.’
What is the purpose of requiring the user – the driver – to be in a ﬁt mental
and physical condition while he is not the one performing the dynamic
driving task like a conventional driver does. The self-driving system is per-
forming the dynamic driving task. For the same reason, one could wonder
if it serves any purpose to require the user/driver to hold a driving permit,
like a conventional driver (art. 24 Geneva Convention, art. 41 paragraph 1
Vienna Convention).
6.3. Arguments for and against this approach
As discussed above, the approach that a start button is also a control of a
vehicle does not require amendments to the Conventions, other than the
approach from maritime and aviation traﬃc law and the approach of a
diﬀerent interpretation of the notion of driver per function. It is also provides
a clearer approach as interpreting the notion of driver diﬀerently per function
of the notion.
Nevertheless, there is a complication. The start button is a control approach
puts the responsibility for the operation of the vehicle with the new driver: the
user of the vehicle. The responsibility for the operation of a conventional
vehicle lies with the conventional driver. The responsibility lies with the conven-
tional driver as he performs the dynamic driving task: he decides to stop for a red
traﬃc light, to slow downwhen driving past a playground, to swerve for someone
stepping out onto the road, etc. The user would, however, under this approach
bear responsibility for the operation of the vehicle – which can subsequently
play a role in (civil and criminal) liability matters (also depending on the insur-
ance scheme)43 – but he would not perform the dynamic driving task, he would
not decide speciﬁcally on any manoeuvre the self-driving system makes. One
could argue that the user has accepted how the self-driving system performs
the dynamic driving task by pressing the start button: by pressing the start
button the user makes the conscious decision to let the self-driving system
43M Schellekens (n 7).
272 N. E. VELLINGA
perform the dynamic driving task, thereby agreeing on the lateral and longitudi-
nalmovements of the vehicle. But is that enough justiﬁcation for holding the user
responsible for the actions of the self-driving system? At the end of the day, the
Parties to the Conventions will have to answer that question.
7. Functioneel daderschap [Option 4]
7.1. The dynamic driving task and the notion of driver
If we take the performance of the dynamic driving task as our point of depar-
ture, it can be argued that, in essence, the driver is who or what has deciding
inﬂuence on the performance of the dynamic driving task. Does this provide
possibilities for automated driving without the need for an extensive overhaul
of the Conventions?
By focusing on the performance of the dynamic driving task, the self-driving
system comes back into the frame as a possible driver. The self-driving system
decides, through its combination of hardware and software, if the vehicle
brakes, swerves, accelerates, etc. If the self-driving system ‘sees’ via its
sensors a pedestrian suddenly stepping onto the road, its software will calculate
to swerve, or brake. If for instance a sensor breaks, the system will decide: con-
tinuing as normal, warn the user of the automated vehicle, or make an emer-
gency stop. All those decisions are made on the spot, in speciﬁc conditions.
Therefore, the dynamic driving task of an automated vehicle is performed
by the self-driving system of the vehicle. So, it can be argued that, when
only taking the performance of the dynamic driving task into account, the
self-driving system of the automated vehicle is the driver of that vehicle.
The (legal) person having the most inﬂuence on the performance of the
dynamic driving task by the self-driving system is the manufacturer of (the
self-driving system of) the automated vehicle. The manufacturer can,
through the hardware and software, determine in advance and to some
extent how the automated vehicle will respond to a certain situation or
event. The manufacturer can decide how much distance the automated
vehicle will keep from a vehicle travelling in front of it, that the automated
vehicle will stop for a red traﬃc light, and that automated vehicle will slow
down when approaching a pedestrian crossing. The manufacturer equips
the vehicle with certain hardware and has the software programmed in a
certain way. So why not attribute the acts of the vehicle or the self-driving
system to the manufacturer, why not hold the manufacturer responsible for
the performance of the dynamic driving task?
7.2. Inspiration from Dutch law
Dutch law is familiar with the attribution of acts to a legal person. In 1979 a
case regarding the statements of an alderman concerning who was liable for
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the collapse of a roof of a primary school was brought before the Dutch
Supreme Court (Hoge Raad).44 The Hoge Raad decided that the statements
by the alderman could be attributed to its municipality, meaning that a
legal person (in this case the municipality) can not only commit a tort
through one of its administrative organs but also through someone like the
alderman, if his acts in society are seen as acts of the legal person.45 The
act of the alderman is seen as the conduct of the municipality itself.46
Under Dutch criminal law, the acts of an individual can be attributed to the
legal person that in eﬀect had control over the conduct, meaning that the legal
person can commit a crime through another person. The Dutch criminal code
(Wetboek van Straftrecht or Sr) already stated that a legal person can commit
a criminal oﬀence (art. 51 Sr)47, when in 2003, a case reached the Hoge Raad
raising questions regarding the attribution of a criminal oﬀence to a legal
person.48 This case concerned a manager of farmlands, a company, who
was convicted by the Court of Appeal for the wrongful use of animal
manure on those farmlands (an economic oﬀence).49 The manager pleaded
that the criminal charges should be dismissed as, among other reasons, she
was not the owner of the farmlands and she had not given anyone permission
to use the manure on the farmlands.50 This case gave the Hoge Raad reason to
explain under what circumstances a criminal oﬀence can be attributed to the
legal person and is to be regarded as an oﬀence committed by the legal person
itself, further developing the theory of functioneel daderschap.51 The legal
person is to be regarded as the oﬀender when the conduct can reasonably
be imputed to him.52 What is a reasonable imputation depends on the
speciﬁc circumstances of the case. The Hoge Raad did not give a general
rule. An important guideline, however, is that if the act took place within
the sphere of the legal person, this act can, in principle, be regarded as
being committed by the legal person. 53 According to the Hoge Raad, such
an act could exist in one or more of the following circumstances:
44HR 6 April 1979, NJ 1980, 34, m. nt. CJH Brunner.
45HR 6 April 1979, NJ 1980, 34, m. nt. CJH Brunner, r.o. 1. See also HR 11 November 2005, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:
AT6018, NJ 2007/231 m.nt. Vranken, r.o. 3.6; HR 7 October 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:2285, JOR 2016/325
m. nt. BM Katan.
46HR 6 April 1979, NJ 1980, 34, m. nt. CJH Brunner.
47Art. 51 lid 1 Sr: ‘Strafbare feiten kunnen worden begaan door natuurlijke personen en rechtspersonen.’
48HR 21 October 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF7938 (drijfmestarrest); Markus J Hornman, ‘De strafrechtelijke
aansprakelijkheid van leidinggevenden van ondernemingen. Een beschouwing vanuit multidimensio-
naal perspectief/Criminal Liability of Corporate Executives. A Multidimensional Approach’ (2016) disser-
tation University of Utrecht, paragraph 2.5.2, 3.3ﬀ.
49Conclusie A-G Wortel, ECLI:NL:PHR:2003:AF7938, 5.
50Conclusie A-G Wortel, ECLI:NL:PHR:2003:AF7938, 11.
51HR 21 October 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF7938 (drijfmestarrest). See also Simone N de Valk ‘Aansprakelijk-
heid voor leidinggevenden naar privaatrechtelijke, strafrechtelijke en bestuursrechtelijke maatstaven’
(dissertation, University of Groningen 2009), paragraph 5.4.3.
52HR 21 October 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF7938 (drijfmestarrest), r.o. 3.3.
53HR 21 October 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF7938 (drijfmestarrest), r.o. 3.4.
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. If it concerns an act or an omission from someone under an employment
or on another basis employed for the beneﬁt of the legal person;
. If the conduct ﬁts into the normal business operations of the legal person;
. If the conduct has been useful to the legal person in its business operations;
. If the legal person had the power to dispose whether the conduct would or
would not take place, and this or similar conduct was, given the actual
course of events, accepted or would be accepted by the legal person.
‘Accepting’ also includes not exercising the care that can reasonably be
required of the legal person to prevent the conduct.54
This shows that under certain conditions an act can be attributed to a legal
person and is to be regarded as the act of the legal person.55 An oﬀence can
not only be committed by the person that commits the conduct, but also by
the legal person that has the power to dispose over the conduct. Although
the legal person did not ‘get its hands dirty’, it is the functioneel dader
(freely translated: vicarious perpetrator). So, the emphasis lies on who has
the power to dispose over the conduct, not so much on who actually
commits the conduct. This approach from Dutch case law can be used as
an example to treat the acts of the self-driving system of an automated
vehicle as the acts of the manufacturer of that vehicle.
7.3. Functioneel daderschap and the Conventions
If the functioneel daderschap approach is applied to automated driving, the
acts of the self-driving system, that performs the dynamic driving task, can
be regarded as being the acts of the manufacturer of the automated vehicle.
For instance, if the automated vehicle overtakes another vehicle on the
wrong side of that vehicle (art. 11 (1)(a) Vienna Convention, see also art.
11 (1) Geneva Convention), this act can be seen as an act of the manufacturer
of this vehicle.
It can be argued that the manufacturer of the automated vehicle, including
the self-driving system, had the power to dispose whether the conduct would
or would not take place, via the hard- and software with which the manufac-
turer equipped the automated vehicle. It has inﬂuence over the response of the
vehicle/system to a traﬃc light, what distance the vehicle will keep from a
vehicle travelling in front of it, if the full capacity of the brakes is used
when stopping for someone who suddenly crosses the road, etc. The manufac-
turer’s acceptance of the behaviour of the vehicle can be derived from the
54HR 21 October 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF7938 (drijfmestarrest), r.o. 3.4. See also HR 23 February 1954, NJ
1954, 378 (ijzerdraad-arrest); HR 14 January 1992, NJ 1992,413.
55Simone N de Valk, ‘Aansprakelijkheid voor leidinggevenden naar privaatrechtelijke, strafrechtelijke en
bestuursrechtelijke maatstaven’ (2009) dissertation University of Groningen, paragraph 5.4.3, Markus J
Hornman (n 48), paragraph 3.4.
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decision of the manufacturer to put the vehicle, with all its ﬂaws, into circula-
tion. It can be argued that this reasoning also applies to an act of an automated
vehicle equipped with self-learning software. After all, it was the manufacturer
who decided to equip the vehicle with self-learning software, and it con-
sciously put it into circulation. Looking at it from this perspective, the
conduct of the self-driving system falls within the sphere of the manufacturer.
Therefore, it can be reasonable to impute the acts of the self-driving system to
the manufacturer and consider them to be acts of the manufacturer. So, along
the lines of the discussed Dutch case law, the manufacturer can be held
responsible for the conduct of the automated vehicle, which can subsequently
lead to criminal or civil liability of the manufacturer. The manufacturer
becomes, as it were, the ‘vicarious driver’ of the automated vehicle.
This functioneel daderschap approach provides an incentive for the manu-
facturer to put only automated vehicles into circulation that have been tried
and tested. If, nevertheless, the manufacturer commits a traﬃc oﬀence
through the automated vehicle that ignored a traﬃc rule, the manufacturer
could be ﬁned for the misconduct of the automated vehicle or perhaps the
(type-) approval of the vehicle could get withdrawn. If the vehicle not only
ignores traﬃc law but also causes damage, the manufacturer could be
exposed to a civil liability claim.56
This approach could ﬁt within the terms of the Conventions if the
deﬁnition of driver is deleted from them (art. 4 (1) Geneva Convention, art.
1 (v) Vienna Convention). The current deﬁnition does not leave room to
treat the system as driver because the system is not a person. This deﬁnition
needs to change in order to facilitate the interpretation of driver as meaning
what/who performs the dynamic driving task.
7.4. Arguments for and against the functioneel daderschap approach
The incentive to put only automated vehicles into circulation that have been
tried and tested could stimulate road traﬃc safety, in line with the aims of the
Conventions. The functioneel daderschap approach also provides clarity
regarding the responsibilities of the parties involved. The approach does
not require a substantial revision of the Conventions, thus avoiding a, possibly
unsuccessful, complicated and lengthy amendment process. A possible disad-
vantage of the functioneel daderschap approach, however, is that it might
hinder innovation. If manufacturers are confronted with high ﬁnes or the
possible withdrawal of the type-approval of their automated vehicle, this
could make manufacturers hesitant to put new automated vehicles with
new technologies into circulation. That way, road traﬃc could be deprived
of technology that beneﬁts road safety. Another disadvantage is that not all
56See, however, on no-fault insurance schemes for self-driving vehicles: M Schellekens (n 7).
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contracting parties to the Conventions might be familiar with this theory or a
similar doctrine, making this functioneel daderschap approach incongruous
with their legal system.57
8. Concluding remarks: the way forward
8.1. The four approaches
Given the current interpretation of the notion of driver, an automated vehicle
does not have a driver within the meaning of the Conventions. Four
approaches on how to accommodate automated driving in the Conventions
have been discussed.
The ﬁrst approach, drawing inspiration from maritime and aviation traﬃc
law, ties in with the existing approach in art. 11 paragraph 9 Vienna Conven-
tion (requiring conformity with the rules of overtaking). Despite this, the
approach does require an extensive overhaul of the Conventions.
The Conventions could be regarded as living instruments, which opens up
the possibility to revise their terms by new ways of interpretation. This can be
done by interpreting the notion of driver per function that the notion has
within the Conventions (the second discussed approach). This provides ﬂexi-
bility, but it also causes uncertainty as the correct interpretation might not
always be clear to the national legislator or judge. It also does not answer
the question of who is responsible for the operation of the automated vehicle.
The third approach, regarding the start button as a control of the vehicle,
does answer this question. If the start button is regarded as a control of the
vehicle, the user can be regarded as the driver of the automated vehicle.
This would mean that the user is responsible for the operation of that
vehicle (which might or might not be acceptable).
The fourth approach, functioneel daderschap, puts responsibility for the
operation of the automated vehicle with the manufacturer of that vehicle.
The acts of the self-driving system are considered to be the acts of the
manufacturer.
Given these four approaches, which approach is most suitable for a driver-
less future?
8.2. Towards a driverless future
Out of the four approaches concerning the revision of the Conventions in
order to accommodate automated driving, the functioneel daderschap
approach oﬀers a considerable beneﬁt over the other approaches: it provides
a clear legal framework without the need for extensive amendments having to
57Erik Gritter, ‘Eﬀectiviteit en aansprakelijkheid in het economisch ordeningsrecht’ (2003) dissertation Uni-
versity of Groningen, Chapter 4.
LAW, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY 277
be made to the Conventions. The deﬁnition of driver will need to be deleted
from the Conventions in order to enable the functioneel daderschap approach,
but that is just a minimal change compared to the overhaul of the Conven-
tions that is required when following the approach from maritime and avia-
tion law discussed above. The only approach that does not require any
amendments to the Conventions is that which treats the start button of the
automated vehicle as a control within the meaning of the notion of driver,
making the user the driver of the automated vehicle. However, that approach
also puts the responsibility for the performance of the dynamic driving task
with the user, who has no actual inﬂuence over the performance of the
dynamic driving task. The manufacturer has, through the hardware and soft-
ware it equips the vehicle with, the most inﬂuence over the performance of the
dynamic driving task. By contrast, the functioneel daderschap approach gives
the opportunity to put the responsibility for the performance of the dynamic
driving task with the (legal) person that has the most inﬂuence over the per-
formance of the dynamic driving task: the manufacturer. The functioneel
daderschap approach therefore provides an answer to the question who is
responsible for the performance of the dynamic driving task, a question
that is left unanswered by the approach adhering to maritime and aviation
traﬃc law and the approach concerning a diﬀerent interpretation of the
notion of driver depending on its function. Therefore, it is concluded that,
out of the discussed approaches, the functioneel daderschap approach is the
most suitable for the Conventions in order to accommodate automated
driving, providing a clear and acceptable legal framework for all the parties
involved.
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